EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 25 September 2026, a Let L-410 UVP registered 9S-GUC, operated by TRACEP Congo Aviation on a Kikwit–Kinshasa service, crashed at Kenge. The Congolese authorities reported 17 fatalities, including 13 passengers and four crew members. Among the victims were Lieutenant General Joseph Mutombo Katalayi Tiende, First President of the High Military Court, and Lieutenant General Lucien-René Likulia Bakumi, Auditor General of the FARDC. The Ministry of Transport subsequently ordered the suspension of the operator’s Air Operator Certificate pending the BPEA investigation.

COGEX considers that the issue goes beyond merely determining a technical cause. A credible investigation must reconstruct the entire safety chain: the condition and airworthiness of the aircraft, maintenance, crew qualifications and decisions, flight preparation and monitoring, air navigation services, availability of alternate aerodromes, organisation of the rescue, regulatory oversight, choice of carrier, and the institutional process that led to the use of this means of transport for an official mission.

GUIDING PRINCIPLE

No hypothesis should be presented as fact before it has been verified. A hypothesis that seems unlikely at the start of an investigation may be confirmed by the evidence; conversely, an apparently plausible hypothesis may be ruled out. The method must therefore remain open, adversarial, traceable and grounded in physical evidence.

This note distinguishes three levels that may be examined: (1) acts, decisions or omissions directly related to the flight; (2) the responsibilities of the oversight, operations, maintenance, navigation, infrastructure and control bodies; (3) governance responsibility, which concerns public choices, the allocation of resources, risk management, follow-up of previous recommendations and the possible persistence of known vulnerabilities.

At the international level, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944, forms the foundation of the global system. Its Article 26 provides for an investigation to be opened by the State in whose territory an accident meeting the criteria of the Convention occurs. ICAO Annex 13 sets out the organisation of the safety investigation, whose purpose is the prevention of accidents and incidents, not the apportionment of blame or liability. Annexes 6, 8, 11, 14 and 19 complete this framework for operations, airworthiness, air traffic services, aerodromes and safety management.

1. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY FACTS

Public information available as of 30 September 2026 indicates that aircraft 9S-GUC was on a flight from Kikwit to Kinshasa when it encountered difficulties en route and attempted to land in the Kenge area. The exact causes of the accident have not been established at this stage. The BPEA has been tasked with the investigation, and the authorities have taken a precautionary measure against the carrier.

COGEX treats these elements solely as preliminary data. They will need to be checked against the manifest, the aircraft’s technical file, maintenance logs, available flight data, radio communications, meteorological information, operational records and witness statements.

2. KEY ISSUE: FROM THE ACCIDENT TO THE SAFETY CHAIN

The central question is not only: “why did the aircraft crash?” It is also: what technical, human, operational, organisational, administrative, regulatory and institutional conditions made possible the sequence of events that led to the accident?

·  Was the aircraft fully airworthy and maintained in accordance with the applicable requirements?

·  Was the flight prepared, authorised, monitored and conducted in accordance with procedures?

·  Were the diversion and emergency landing options realistic, known and accessible?

·  Were infrastructure, communications, aeronautical information and rescue services available and adequate?

·  Was the carrier subject to regulatory oversight that was sufficient and proportionate to its risk profile?

·  For a sensitive official mission, who chose the mode of transport, the operator and the aircraft, and on the basis of what safety guarantees?

3. NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE DRC

The analysis must first be grounded in positive Congolese law. Without claiming to cover all applicable technical regulations, the main structuring texts to be considered include, in particular:

· Law No. 10/014 of 31 December 2010 on civil aviation;

· Law No. 23/001 of 12 January 2023 amending and supplementing Law No. 10/014 of 31 December 2010;

· Decree No. 12/030 of 2 October 2012 on the conditions for obtaining, renewing, suspending and withdrawing the air services operating licence and the air operator certificate;

· Decree No. 12/035 of 2 October 2012 establishing, organising and governing the Permanent Bureau for Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation (BPEA);

· Decree No. 12/037 of 2 October 2012 on standards for the design, construction, technical operation and maintenance of aerodromes open to public air traffic;

· the Aeronautical Regulations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RACD), as well as the decisions, procedures, circulars and technical requirements of the Civil Aviation Authority (AAC/RDC).

These texts govern, in particular, the certification and oversight of operators, airworthiness, personnel licensing, aerodromes, air navigation services and the institutional regime for safety investigations.

4. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK: CHICAGO CONVENTION AND ICAO STANDARDS

As a State party to the international civil aviation system, the DRC frames its regulations and oversight within the Convention on International Civil Aviation, known as the Chicago Convention, signed on 7 December 1944. This Convention laid down the principles for the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation and established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

4.1. Article 26 of the Convention: obligation to investigate

Article 26 establishes that, where an accident meets the conditions laid down in the Convention, the State in whose territory the accident occurs shall institute an inquiry into its circumstances, in accordance with its own laws and, as far as possible, with the procedures recommended by ICAO. For the Kenge accident, this principle reinforces the primary responsibility of the Congolese State for organising a credible safety investigation.

4.2. Article 37: uniformity of standards and procedures

The Chicago architecture also rests on international harmonisation. States cooperate to secure the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organisation relating to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services wherever such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.

4.3. Article 38: notification of differences

Where a State cannot fully comply with an international standard or adopts a different practice, the Chicago system provides for a mechanism to notify differences. This logic is important: the existence of international standards does not exempt the State from transposing them, reporting relevant deviations and, above all, ensuring effective oversight.

4.4. Particularly relevant technical Annexes

Annex 13 deserves particular attention. The purpose of a safety investigation is to prevent future accidents and incidents. It is distinct from both a criminal investigation and a disciplinary or administrative procedure. This functional separation is essential to protect the search for technical truth while still allowing, where the facts warrant it, the separate exercise of judicial and administrative powers.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ICAO FRAMEWORK

In March 2026, the ICAO Council approved an amendment to Annex 13 aimed in particular at strengthening independence, transparency and the management of conflicts of interest in investigations. The announced amendment will become applicable in November 2028; it is therefore not presented here as an obligation already applicable to the Kenge accident, but as a relevant international direction regarding the credibility of investigations.

5. INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONGOLESE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Aviation safety cannot be assessed solely by the formal existence of legal texts. What matters is their effectiveness: transposition of standards, certification, inspections, continuous oversight, handling of safety occurrences, risk analysis, proportionate sanctions, implementation of recommendations and availability of competent technical resources.

The investigation should therefore establish not only whether the operator and the aircraft complied with national requirements, but also whether the Congolese oversight system made it possible to identify and correct, in a timely manner, the risks revealed by actual operations.

6. LET L-410 AIRCRAFT: AREAS OF TECHNICAL EXAMINATION

· certificate of airworthiness and regulatory status of the aircraft;

· maintenance history, scheduled checks and deferred work;

·  condition of the engines, propellers, electrical systems, fuel and flight controls;

· weight and balance at departure;

· fuel on board, fuel quality and endurance;

·  previous defects, applicable MEL/CDL and corrective actions;

·  operational history of the aircraft and previous technical events;

·   availability and readout of flight recorders or other data sources.

7. KENGE AND ALTERNATE INFRASTRUCTURE

Available public information raises questions about the condition and actual use of the former Kenge aerodrome. This point must be verified by the competent authorities on the basis of aeronautical documents. A rigorous investigation will need to determine which diversion options were officially published, operationally usable and known to the crew at the time of the event.

ICAO Annex 14 and Congolese aerodrome regulations provide an analytical framework here: physical characteristics, obstacles, maintenance, markings, aeronautical information, opening status, emergency procedures and local coordination.

8. EMERGENCY LANDING HYPOTHESIS

If the evidence confirms that the crew was attempting an emergency landing, the exact sequence of events must be reconstructed: the nature of the anomaly, when it was detected, the crew’s decisions, communications, the options considered, the aircraft’s residual performance, weather conditions and the characteristics of the terrain.

This reconstruction must avoid hindsight bias: a decision should not be judged solely by its tragic outcome, but in light of the information actually available to the crew at the moment it was made.

9. FLIGHT PLAN, COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES

·       flight plan filed and any amendments;

·       clearances, flight path and radar tracking or other available traces;

·       communications between the crew and air traffic services;

·       urgency or distress messages;

·       available meteorological information and NOTAMs;

·       coordination between ATS units, local authorities and rescue services.

10. RECORDERS, DATA AND OTHER SOURCES OF EVIDENCE

The presence, type and condition of the flight recorders must be officially established. If the recorders are unavailable or unusable, the investigation will need to draw on all alternative sources: maintenance data, telecommunications traces, GPS, tracking systems, videos, photographs, meteorological data, operational documents and witness statements.

11. WRECKAGE, SITE AND CHAIN OF CUSTODY

Protecting the site and ensuring the traceability of parts are essential. The investigation must document the position of the debris, damage, signs of fire, structural failures, engines, propellers and systems, while maintaining a chain of custody that meets the needs of the safety investigation and, where applicable, of the judicial authorities.

12. WHY AIR TRANSPORT FOR THIS MISSION?

The presence of senior military justice officials on board requires a careful but thorough examination of the logistical process that led to this trip. This question does not imply that a wrongful choice was made; it seeks to understand how the risk was assessed.

·       Who proposed and approved the use of air transport?

·       Who chose or approved the carrier and the aircraft?

·       What safety checks were requested or received?

·       Was there a due diligence procedure for transporting senior State officials?

·       Were alternative means of transport or another operator considered?

·       Had the previous accident involving the same operator, if confirmed in official records, been factored into the risk assessment?

13. RECONSTRUCTING THE DECISION-MAKING CHAIN

The decision-making chain must be reconstructed on the basis of documents, without presuming fault: mission order, logistical arrangements, transport request, selection of the service provider, operational approval, administrative control, verification of safety conditions, and the authority empowered to modify or halt the mission.

GOVERNANCE QUESTION

For an official mission involving top-ranking officials, safety should not depend merely on logistical availability. It should be governed by a documented risk-management process, with selection criteria, compliance checks and clearly assigned responsibility.

14. THREE LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO BE EXAMINED

In the spirit of an analytical framework developed in public debate, but reformulated here independently by COGEX, the examination of possible responsibilities can be structured into three complementary levels.

14.1. First level: acts, decisions and omissions directly related to the flight

This level concerns persons whose acts or omissions may have had a direct link to the preparation, authorisation, maintenance, conduct or monitoring of the flight. Depending on the evidence, it may include operational decisions, maintenance, weight and balance, fuel, documentary compliance, crew procedures and emergency management.

14.2. Second level: operating, oversight and support structures

This level concerns the organisations whose functions underpin safety: the carrier, maintenance organisations, air navigation services, aerodrome operators, the civil aviation authority, search and rescue services, and any body responsible for certification, inspection, oversight or aeronautical information.

14.3. Third level: governance and systemic responsibility

This level examines institutional choices that may create, tolerate or prolong vulnerabilities: chronic under-investment, weak risk-based oversight, failure to follow up on recommendations, fragmented responsibilities, lack of lessons-learned mechanisms, insufficient technical resources or inadequate procedures for sensitive official travel.

These three levels prejudge neither guilt nor the existence of fault. They make it possible to distinguish possible individual error from organisational dysfunction and systemic risk.

15. FROM UNLIKELY HYPOTHESES TO ESTABLISHED FACTS

A serious aviation investigation must not rule out a line of inquiry either because it seems politically sensitive or because it appears technically unlikely at first sight. It must, however, rank hypotheses according to the evidence. Methodological openness permits neither speculation nor accusation: on the contrary, it demands rigorous verification.

RULE OF METHOD

Hypothesis ≠ fact. Correlation ≠ causation. Anomaly ≠ fault. Potential responsibility ≠ guilt. Only evidence that has been gathered, cross-checked and analysed can turn a hypothesis into an established finding.

16. POSSIBLE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

If objective evidence reveals offences, falsifications, criminally punishable negligence, deliberate violations or other matters falling under criminal law, the competent judicial authority may act in accordance with its own rules. This process must remain separate from the safety investigation within the meaning of Annex 13, whose purpose is preventive.

17. ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY LIABILITY

Independently of criminal liability, the administration may examine the compliance of certificates, licences, approvals, procedures, inspections and oversight obligations. The suspension of a carrier’s certificate is a precautionary or administrative measure; it does not, in itself, constitute a conclusion as to the cause of the accident.

18. GOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITY AND CHAIN OF COMMAND

The institutional dimension deserves particular attention given the status of the passengers. It will be necessary to identify the authority that organised the mission, the body responsible for logistics, the entity that selected the operator, the checks carried out, and the level at which the risk could be accepted, reduced or refused.

·       Who decided that these officials would travel by this means?

·       Who selected or approved the operator?

·       Who was responsible for verifying compliance and the level of safety?

·       Who had the authority to postpone, modify or cancel the trip?

·       Is there a policy for the safe transport of senior civilian, judicial and military officials?

19. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES: AAC/RDC, BPEA, RVA AND OTHER SERVICES

The AAC/RDC performs regulatory, certification and oversight functions. The RVA is involved in particular in the air navigation services within its remit, while other specialised bodies provide meteorological or related functions. The BPEA is responsible for investigating aviation accidents and incidents. The effectiveness of the system depends on clearly defined competences, functional independence, coordination and access to technical resources.

20. THE WALIKALE PRECEDENT AND ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING

Public sources report that another Let L-410 linked to the same operator was lost at Walikale approximately two months earlier. This precedent must be verified in official records and analysed with caution. It does not allow a common cause to be concluded, but it justifies asking what corrective actions, inspections or risk assessments followed the first event.

21. INDEPENDENCE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE INVESTIGATION

Confidence in the conclusions will depend on the genuine independence of the investigation, access to evidence, the competence of the investigators and procedural transparency. If specific technical capabilities are lacking, the ICAO framework allows the expertise of other States, regional bodies or qualified experts to be requested, through the mechanisms provided.

COGEX recommends that no authority liable to be examined in respect of oversight, operations, infrastructure or the decision-making chain should be able to control the production of the technical conclusions on its own.

22. JUST CULTURE AND LESSONS LEARNED

Prevention requires a culture in which safety occurrences can be reported and analysed without every error being automatically equated with fault. This “just culture” does not rule out accountability in cases of deliberate or grossly negligent conduct; it protects the system’s ability to learn from incidents, near misses and errors before they produce irreversible consequences.

23. PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

In a case involving senior State officials, the absence of verified information fuels rumour. COGEX recommends regular communication from the BPEA that clearly distinguishes between: confirmed facts, elements being verified, technical hypotheses, precautionary measures and an indicative timetable for the investigation.

24. IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS

·       secure and fully document the site and the wreckage;

·       preserve all maintenance, operational and certification records;

·       seize and safeguard communication and flight-tracking data;

·       establish the exact status of Kenge aerodrome and of the available alternate aerodromes;

·       audit the operator’s fleet, technical records and operational practices;

·       reconstruct the administrative chain that led to the choice of carrier for the mission;

·       ensure formal coordination between the safety investigation and the judicial authorities without compromising Annex 13 independence;

·       publish an initial official factual statement as soon as the essential checks allow.

25. MEDIUM-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

·       strengthen the technical and budgetary capacity of the BPEA;

·       develop risk-based oversight within the AAC/RDC;

·       introduce public and traceable follow-up of safety recommendations;

·       audit secondary aerodromes and the actual diversion options;

·       strengthen search and rescue services and airport emergency plans;

·       establish a due diligence procedure for the air transport of official delegations;

·       improve national collection of incident and near-miss data;

·       train operators and authorities in safety management in line with the principles of Annex 19.

26. COGEX PROPOSAL: NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AND MODERNISATION PLAN 2027–2032

COGEX proposes that, beyond the Kenge accident, the Congolese authorities develop a multi-year programme built around five action verbs: PREVENT – OVERSEE – INVESTIGATE – CORRECT – MODERNISE.

27. PRELIMINARY MATRIX OF HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

28. INSTITUTIONAL ROADMAP

·       0–30 days: securing evidence, document collection, preliminary factual statement, precautionary audits.

·       1–6 months: technical analyses, interviews, review of oversight, audit of infrastructure and of the decision-making chain.

·       6–12 months: final report or, if the investigation is prolonged, a substantial interim statement; priority recommendations.

·       12–24 months: verifiable implementation of recommendations and publication of a monitoring dashboard.

·       2027–2032: structural modernisation of the national aviation safety system aligned with the State Safety Programme and Annex 19.

29. CONCLUSION

The Kenge accident must be treated as a major safety event and as a test of institutional maturity. The loss of 17 lives, including top-ranking military justice officials, demands an independent, technically rigorous and transparent investigation.

The search for causes must not be limited to the moment of the crash. It must trace back along the safety chain: aircraft, crew, operator, maintenance, air navigation, infrastructure, regulator, mission organisation and governance. Only on this condition can any responsibilities be fairly distinguished between individual acts, organisational failures and systemic vulnerabilities.

The Chicago Convention and the ICAO Annexes provide a clear international framework: safety rests on common standards, effective oversight, an independent preventive investigation and continuous learning. Congolese law also provides institutions and legal instruments. The decisive question is now that of their actual implementation.

COGEX’S FINAL QUESTION

Beyond the search for responsibility, what concrete, verifiable and lasting measures will be taken to ensure that the lessons of Kenge genuinely change the Congolese aviation safety system?

30. COGEX POSITION AND FINAL PROPOSAL

COGEX recommends the publication, at the end of the investigation, not only of the technical conclusions and safety recommendations, but also of a public implementation plan specifying for each recommendation: the responsible authority, the corrective action, the deadline, the progress status and the verification mechanism.

COGEX remains available, while respecting its independence, to contribute to reflection on safety governance, institutional modernisation, risk management and human capital development in strategic sectors.

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES

·       Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), signed on 7 December 1944, ICAO, Doc 7300.

·       ICAO, Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft.

·       ICAO, Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft.

·       ICAO, Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services.

·       ICAO, Annex 12 – Search and Rescue.

·       ICAO, Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation.

·       ICAO, Annex 14 – Aerodromes.

·       ICAO, Annex 19 – Safety Management.

·       ICAO, Doc 9756 – Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation.

·       DRC, Law No. 10/014 of 31 December 2010 on civil aviation.

·       DRC, Law No. 23/001 of 12 January 2023 amending and supplementing Law No. 10/014 of 31 December 2010 on civil aviation.

·       DRC, Decree No. 12/030 of 2 October 2012 on the air services operating licence and the air operator certificate.

·       DRC, Decree No. 12/035 of 2 October 2012 establishing, organising and governing the BPEA.

·       DRC, Decree No. 12/037 of 2 October 2012 on aerodromes open to public air traffic.

·       Civil Aviation Authority of the DRC, Aeronautical Regulations of the DRC (RACD) and applicable regulatory documentation.

FACTUAL SOURCES CONSULTED FOR THIS NOTE

·       Congolese Ministry of Transport / official dispatches relayed by the Agence Congolaise de Presse and Radio Okapi, 26–27 September 2026.

·       Permanent Bureau for Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation (BPEA), preliminary information relayed by aviation sources.

·       The Aviation Herald, “Crash: Tracep L410 at Kenge on Sep 25th 2026”, updated 26 September 2026.

·       Associated Press, coverage of the Kenge accident, September 2026.

·       ICAO, official pages on the Chicago Convention, Annex 13 and safety management.

METHODOLOGICAL DISCLAIMER

This note is a preliminary institutional analysis based on information available as of 30 September 2026. It does not replace the BPEA report, a judicial aviation expert assessment, or any administrative or judicial decision. The facts and characterisations will need to be updated as new official data are published.